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Fair Use and the Faces of Transformation, Part II 
Prof. James Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law 
January 26, 2015 
In my last IP Viewpoints entry, I discussed the origin of “transformation” as a major factor in 
copyright’s fair use doctrine.  In particular, I focused on “expressive” transformation, in which 
the user changes the actual content of the copyrighted work.  Taking old works and turning them 
into something new is the way that culture usually evolves, so it is no surprise that copyright law 
would sometimes allow users to engage in such conduct without needing to pay for the privilege. 
Yet there is also a second kind of transformation, one that does not involve the alteration of the 
underlying material.  Indeed, this kind of transformation often involves wholesale, verbatim 
reproduction of all the expression in a copyrighted work.  How could such uses be considered 
transformative, let alone fair? 
The answer lies in the repurposing of the works.  For example, consider the case of Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Publishing.  Dorling Kindersley used several images of vintage 
Grateful Dead concert posters in its coffee table book, without securing a license.  There was 
expressive transformation here, because the images in the book were a fraction of the size of the 
originals.  But the court also pointed out that the use “is transformatively different from the 
original expressive purpose.”  The original use of the images was “artistic expression and 
promotion,” whereas the new use repurposed them as historical artifacts. 
This “purpose” transformation is itself valuable, in that it creates something new.  It adds 
value.  It makes the pie bigger.  The same is true of expressive transformation, of course, but in a 
different way.  (This may be why the fair use statuteasks about not only the “character” of the 
use, but also its “purpose.”) 
Indeed, in some instances this added value depends on the repurposing of multiple works, in their 
entirety.  Take Google’s Internet search engine.  In order to enable such searching, Google 
makes copies of Internet content (much of which is copyrighted), indexes it, and then makes it 
available in its search results as snippets – or, in the case of images, thumbnails.  This process 
involves little or no transformation of the underlying expression.  But the ability to search the 
Internet is obviously of great value to society, and would simply not be possible in a world in 
which licensing was required. 
Thus cases like Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com and Field v. Google have found these sorts of uses to 
be fair.  No one is going to use the thumbnails available through Google Search as a substitute 
for the full-size images.  In this way, therefore, they transform the purpose of the work, creating 
a new thing rather than merely “superseding the objects of the original” (to borrow a phrase from 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in one of the foundational fair use cases).  And the 
fact that Google does this to thousands of copyrighted works actually bolsters the case for fair 
use, because the added value derives directly from the scale of the enterprise – the aggregation of 
Internet content. 
The same is true of other search engines, like the anti-plagiarism program at issue in A.V. v. 
iParadigms.  For the program to work, schools had to upload students’ papers en masse to a 
central database.  Some students objected, citing their copyrights in the papers.  When 
iParadigms claimed fair use, the students responded that “iParadigms’ use of their works cannot 
be transformative because the archiving process does not add anything to the work.”  The court 
found that argument to be “clearly misguided,” noting that “[t]he use of a copyrighted work need 
not alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature.  Rather, it can be transformative in 
function or purpose without altering or actually adding to the original work.” 
The latest battle over purpose transformation – and the battle that may decide the legitimacy of 
purpose transformation once and for all – involves the Authors Guild suit over Google Books, 
which presents a very direct example of how making copyrighted works searchable involves 
wholesale copying of their content.  (I have explained the case before, so I will not do so again 
here.)  That case is now before a panel of the Second Circuit, which heard oral argument last 
month. 
Will purpose transformation carry the day for Google Books?  No one knows for sure.  But the 
presiding judge at the Second Circuit hearing was none other than Pierre Leval, whom you will 
recall is the one who first articulated transformation as a fair use centerpiece.  The smart money 
is on Google. 
© 2015 James Gibson 
 
